LA (NON) PROPORZIONALITÀ DELLA SORVEGLIANZA BANCARIA NELL'UE: PROBLEMI E PROSPETTIVE

The principle of proportionality in the legislative process has long-standing recognition on both sides of the Atlantic. Banking regulation in the past 30 years has not been consistent with the principle, notably in Europe. Two dimensions must be taken into account, i.e. rules for: (i) banking firms of different size/business models and (ii) banks vs shadow banking entities. The problems are compounded by the prolonged recourse to monetary easing and ultralow interest rates, with adverse consequences for traditional credit institutions. After the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2007-09, the Coronavirus Pandemic (CP) in 2020 exacerbates difficulties for medium-small sized banks (MSB), especially in the EU on account of the one-size-fits-all (OSFA) surveillance. As happened after the GFC - and as documented in the paper - the different policy responses to the CP magnify again these difficulties. In the US a $2 trillion package of fiscal measures has been rapidly enacted, which contains significant support measures for local communities, enterprises and banks. In the EU a prolonged debate on fiscal responses continues to shift the burden on the ECB. Also as a consequence of the inadequate economic policy response, MSB may become the sacrificial victims of non-proportionality in the EU, and notably in Italy. The dangers of this outcome and the possible remedial actions are explored in this article.